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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
9138

vs.
CHARLES CUNNINGHAM and WINFORD BUNCE,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as appellants' nstatement of facts" merely
repeats portions of the pleadings, and such facts as are relied
upon by appellants appear only as terse conclusions scattered
throughout the argument, a restatement is necessary.
The pleadings showed disagreement as to plaintiffs' rights
(R. 1-4, 7-13), but discovery procedures made it clear that
1
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there was ccno genuine issue as to any material fact."* In the
following statement, the deposition of Robert M. Worsley,
an employee of respondent (R. 63), will be identified by
nW," and the deposition of appellant Bunce (R. 62), by
C(B". Inasmuch as appellant Cunningham deferred to Bunce~s
version of the facts (Cunningham deposition, pp. 46, 48), his
testimony will not be referred to separately.
In 1954 appellants' title to the Prospector Lodge, a motel
in Moab, was encumbered by a real estate mortgage (B. 3) .
On or about February 3, 1956, appellants executed and delivered to respondent Continental a promissory note, a copy
of which as attached to amended complaint (R. 2, 7, para. 1;
B. 1-2; W.3). The note was evidence of a loan from Continental to appellants for the purchase of storm doors for the
lodge (B. 2-3; W. 18). On April 2, 1956, the real estate
mortgage on the lodge was refinanced with First Security Bank
of Utah (R. 8; B. 3).
On or about May 1, 1956, appellants sold the lodge,
apparently reserving a right to repossess in event of default,
to Mesa Development Company, of which C. P. Dickson was
the principal officer (R. 3-4). Mesa, which was to make payments on the First Security mortgage, entered into possession
(B. 4). In about November or December, 1956, Mesa defaulted
on both the purchase contract and the mortgage (B. 5) .
*Appellants served upon respondent an "Answer to Request for
Admissions," ad1nitting that Exhibits "A" through "D" were true
and correct copies, and admitting Paragraph 5 of respondent's requests.
The requests are at R. 37-5 2; though designated as part of the record
by appellants (R. 58) the original answer apparently was not filed. A
copy of this answer is set forth in Appendix A.
2
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The last payment on appellants' Continental note, disallowing returned checks, was made December 17, 1956 (W.
10). Continental contacted Bunce numerous times thereafter
regarding payment, Bunce always indicating that Dickson
owed appellants 1noney and promising Continental would be
paid when that money was received (R. 27; W. 3).
On about April 30, 1957, First Security commenced an
action to foreclose its mortgage (R. 49; B. 6). Meanwhile,
Joe Santi and another were seeking to purchase Mesa's and
appellants' interests in the property. They had deposited
$1,000.00 earnest money with Jones Realty in Moab, toward
an expected purchase price of $165,000.00. Bunce believed
Dickson was ngoofing the deal up" and appellants talked to
Santi, trying to ((resurrect the sale" so that they could ((get
get out with a whole hide." Bunce ((probably" told Continental
of t~e negotiations. The transaction with Santi fell through.
Bunce quoted Santi as saying, ((Hell, this thing is getting in
foreclosure. Why should I worry about dealing with Dickson
or you or anybody else? I will wait until the bank gets it and
then I will buy it for nothing" (B. 6-11, 17).
On May 29, 1957, First Security entered a default in the
foreclosure action, and on June 3, 1957, Mesa filed a ((Claim
to Property." On June 5, 1957, Mr. Bunce ((might have" in~
formed Continental that First Se~urity had said it ~as going
to foreclose on June 10, 1957 (B. 11). A short time prior to
June 10 Worsley called Bunce and asked for payment on the
Continental note. Bunce told him of the contract for sale of
the motel, of First Security's first mortgage and commencement
of the foreclosure suit, of Dickson's failure to make payment

3
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on the Mesa contract, and of appellants' inability to pay
Continental befo~e Dickson paid them. Bunce did offer, on
behalf of himself and Cunningham, to give Continental a
second mortgage on the lodge for protection if the property
were sold. Worsley accepted (R. 25-26; B. 11-12).
Worsley prepared the ((mortgage" and on June 10 appellants executed it; it was recorded (R. 26, 35, 49, B. 11-12;
W. 3). At that time, appellants told Worsley they expected
Dickson to pay on the contract, in which case they could pay
Continental (R. 26).
On or about June 13, 1957, appellants served a notice to quit
upon (B. 8, 12), and on June 19 commenced suit against,
Mesa (B. 12-13). On July 8 First Security bid in the property
at foreclosure sale. Pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure, a
sheriff's deed ~as executed, but perhaps not delivered, at that
time (R. 49, B. 13).
Thereafter, still in July, 1957, Mesa appeared in appellants' action for possession. Following ((legal maneuvering,"
including an order to show cause, appellants and Mesa entered
into a stipulation (B. 13-14). Dated September 4, 1957, the
stipulation is set out at R. 39-43 and an amendment at R. 44.
The stipulation set up a new contract payment schedule and
gave Mesa the opportunity to redeem from First Security by
November 1, 19 57, substituting another first mortgage for
that of First Security. No express provision was made for subordination of Continental's mortgage (R. 39-44). It was contemplated that Mesa would obtain its financing from Hal
Hancock, who would be the nF.w first mortgagee (B. 14-1.5),
that Continental would retain its position, and that appellants

4
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would accupy a third position (B. 14-15). Pursuant to the
stipulation, Mesa made a payment of $10,500.00 in October,
1957, but did not redeem from First Security on November
1 (B. 18-19). Appellants did not hold Mesa to the stipulated
deadline for redemption; on advice of their attorney, Mr.
Snow, and the attorney for First Security, Mr. Ruggeri, they
delayed repossession until December (R. 30; B. 19, 21-22).
First Security's attorney was also acting as a scrivener for the
Hancock interests (B. 22).
On about November 7, 1957, Snow telephoned Worsley,
informing him that Dickson was arranging to borrow approximately $45,000.00 from Hancock to redeem from First
Security, but that Hancock would not lend enough to satisfy
appellants' indebtedness to Continental. He asked Continental
to subordinate its mortgage to Hancock's. Worsley indicated
that Continental would do so if it received a renewal. note
providing for $200 per month payments (R. 27; W. 7). It was
Worsley's understanding .that Mesa's October, 1957, payment.
to appellants had been employed to clear several judgments
which were prior to Continental's lien (W. 7). As a result of
the Snow-Worsley conversation, Ruggeri came to Salt Lake
City prior to November 22, 1957 (R. 27; W. 8). At that time
Worsley reiterated respondent's position (B. 15, 22; W. 8),
and on November 22 wrote to Ruggeri as follows, with enclosures as indicated:
ttln accordance with your request we enclose a release
of second mortgage as well as a promissory note in
the amount of $2,285.28 repayable in twelve monthly
installments of $190.44 together with the new second
mortgage.
5
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ccwe

understand our release of mortgage will be
filed only if the Mesa Development Company is able
to redeem this property by negotiation of a new first
mortgage loan and that the new second mortgage will
be executed by the Mesa Development Company and
filed as a second mortgage together with the new note,
signed by J\1esa Development Company and endorsed
by Charles Cunningham and Winford Bunce" (R. 27;

w. 8).

Discouraged finally by Mesa's inability to perform its
agreement, appellants decided to close it out (B. 19-22), and
did so by a Decree (R. 48) based upon Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 45-47). Although the Findings and
Conclusions and Decree are dated November 16, 195 7 (R.
47-48), appellants and their counsel considered them to be
effective as of either December 13 or 16, 1957, the date on
which they_ were filed (B. 20-21).
After December 13 or 16, 1957, appellants understood
that: ((Mesa and Dickson were out of the picture legally" and
ccdidn't have any legal rights at all to the property"; that
appellants nwere not committed to anything," for Dickson
Was out if we wanted him to stay out of it," because, although
Bunce talked to Dickson ((at least once after that, maybe more,"
he considered that, if he ((wanted to make another deal,'' he
was ((free to do it" or nfree to turn it down"; and that they
were ((free to negotiate with other people . . . just as freely
as" they could with Mesa (B. 20-21) .•During later negotiations, appellants felt no legal obligation to Dickson or Mesa
0

(B. 27).
January 8, 1958 was the last day for redemption from the

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sale of the lodge to First Security (B. 18; W. 6-17). A few
days before January 8, both Worsley and Bunce had had
conversations· with Dickson in which Dickson indicated he
still wished to redeem the property if he could (W. 5-6, 13-14;
R. 29-30). On the morning of January 8, Dickson called
Worsley from Denver (W. 5, 13-14). nHe said an agent of
his by the name of Hal Hancock was at the Newhouse Hotel,
that he would contact me (Worsley] a little later on with
arrangements to pay off this account and get an asignment of
the mortgage" (W. 5). [It later became apparent that Hancock
was acting for himself rather than for Dickson (B. 42; W. 5) ;
but at that time Worsley thought · Hancock would redeem in
Dickson's name (W. 6) ].
Hancock did contact Worsley that day, proposing that
Continental assign its interest to him so the lodge might be
redeemed. He said he had a check for $45,000.00 with which
to effect the redemption (W. 6). Hancock indicated, however,
that he wished to be obligated to pay the amount of appellants'
indebtedness to respondent only if he could actually redeem
from First Securitr (W. 28) . Continental accepted Hancock's
proposal (R. 49-50, W. 3-4), and a letter agreement was drawn
by Mr. Adams, respondent's attorney (R. 27, W. 28). It is
set out at R. 51 and appellants' brief, page 10. Pusuant
thereto, Hancock delivered his note to Continental (W. 4,
9, 14) which delivered to Hancock appellants' mortgage to
it (W. 4); a photostatic copy of appellants' note (W. 4, 3031) ; and an assignment of Continental's interest in the note
and mortgage (R. 52; W. 4, 27-28; App. Brf. 9). Appellants
had actual notice of the assignment (B. 33) .
7
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On the afternoon of January 8, 1958, Ruggeri called
Bunce, (;lnd stated that Dickson or his attorney, Woodbury, had
asked for an extra day in which to redeem the property as they
could not get to Moab on the 8th (R. 30). On January 9,
1958, Woodbury, either Hancock (R. 11; B. 24) or Dickson
(R. 30), and two others (B. 24) went to Ruggeri's office.
Glen Carlson, a representative of the Moab Branch of First
Security, was there (R. 26) (B. 24). Ruggeri and Carlson
refused to allow redemption on the basis of the Continental
mortgage inasmuch as those seeking to redeem had not made
provision for the protection of appellants (R. 30; B. 24). The
would-be redemptioners threatened and contemplated a law
suit based upon such refusal (R. 11; B. 31; W. 24).
Presumably in the hope that First Security would allow
Cunningham and him to regain their interest in the lodge
despite expiration of the redemption period, between January
8 and 31 Bunce sought financing (R. 30-31; B. 26). After
some failures (R. 30-31), on or about January 25 appellants
entered into a verbal agreement with Carlson (in his individual
capacity) and Cecil Thompson under which Carlson and
Thompson would put up money to redeem from First Security,
and credit to pay Continental. The property was to be taken
over by Carlson and Thompson if Cunningham and Bunce
were unable to sell or refinance the property within 90 days
(R. 31; B. 26-27).
On January 31, 1958, Bunce and Snow upon talking to
First Security's Salt Lake attorney, were told that they and
only they might redeem, but that First Security was ~~threat
ened with this hundred thousand dollar lawsuit with this guy
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Hancock and Dickson here, whoever all is in it, but if you
will pay Continental bank or get those boys out of the picture
some way, we will take your money and let you have it"
(B. 29). This was confirmed by the President of First Security
-but with a caveat that the matter would have to be cleared
up in 60 or 90 days (B. 30). It is not clear from the record
whether Bunce believed that only Continental's mortgage
had to be cleared or whether the Hancock-Dickson suit also
had to be suppressed (R. 32; R. 30-31).
Following the conference with Quinney (First Security's
counsel) and Eccles (its president) , Bunce and Snow met with
Worsley and Adams (R. 27-28; B. 30, 39-41; W. 8-9, 16-22),
Bunce telling Worsley he had come to pay off the mortgage
(R. 27). At that time, Bunce had neither a cashier's check
nor a certified check; he did not have the money in his account,
but only the Thompson-Carlson agreement to cover the check
(R. 39) . Worsley told Bunce that Hanco~ck had not returned
the assignment of the note and mortgage but that since Hancock's note was overdue he would call Woodbury and demand
either payment or the mortgage (R. 28-29; B. 29). Bunce
told Worsley that appellants had the money to release from
First Security but that they were first required to pay off Continental and see that Hancock and Dickson were out of the
picture (R. 28) . Worsley or Adams called Woodbury and
asked that the note and mortgage be reassigned or that Mr.
Hancock's note be paid (R. 28; B. 41; W. 9, 17). Woodbury
said that he would have to call Denver (Hancock's residence)
about it (W. 18), and Worsley asked Bunce and Snow to
return later (R. 28; B. 41). When they returned, Worsley
called Woodbury, who refused to reassign (R. 28; B. 41), and

9
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Worsley arranged for Bunce and Snow to confer with Woodbury (B. 41) .1
Bunce and Snow called on Woodbury, who said he would
not give up the assignment, because he was planning to sue
First Security (R. 29; B. 29-31). Although Woodbury said
he would call appellants later, he did not (B. 31).
Appellants never again contacted Continental, Woodbury,
Hancock, Dickson or First Security (R. 18-19, 22-23, 26-31,
35) . Continental, however, continued its efforts to acquire the
assignment and mortgage from Hancock or his attorneys (W.
15). It was to be returned in July, 1958, but was not because
of illness in Woodbury's family (W. 11). On August 25,
1958, respondent sent a suit letter to Hancock (W. 17), and
on September 2, 1958, Hancock returned the requested papers,
and Continental returned his note and agreement to him
(W. 15).
On December 23, 1958, respondent commenced action
upon appellants' note (R. 1) .
On March 16, 1959, appellants served respondent with an
answer and counterclaim alleging a conspiracy between Continental and Hancock (R. 7-13). The essential averments of
the counterclaim were denied by Continental (R. 14-16).
On August 19, 1959, respondent's motion for summary
lOut of the foregoing conference, arises the only dispute of fact which
respondent can discern f ro1n the record. Worsley recalls that Bunce
did not have the money to pay his indebtedness (W. 21). Bunce denies
imparting any information to that effect (B. 40-41). For purpose of this
appeal, respondent assumes Bunce is correct.

10
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judgment was heard, and on August 20, 1959, a judgment
was entered dismissing appellants' counterclaim with prejudice.
Respondent specifically objects to the following recitation
of fact by respondent:
(a) That the counterclaim alleged a conspiracy between
respondent and Hancock (Cto deprive defendants of their
equity in the mortgaged premises" ( App. Brf. 2). The counterclaim in fact alleged that the conspiracy was to ((redeem the
said motel property in the name of Hal Hancock, without
paying the sum due the defendants under the agreement made
with said Mesa Development Corporation by the said C. P.
Dickson" (R. 10-11) and nto cheat and defraud the defendants" (R. 12).
(b) That at the hearing on respondent's motion for summary judgment the defense ((stated that the counterclai1n
contained the facts which constituted defendants' claim" ( App.
Brf. 3). The only recitation of statements of counsel at the
hearing is contained in the judgment, to-wit: ((that the record
set forth the undisputed facts _as to the basis of defendants'
counter-claim" (R. 53). Appellants made no motion to alter
or amend such recitation.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE THEORY OF APPELLANTS IS AT VARIANCE
WITH THEIR THEORY BELOW.
II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A FRAUDULENT
AND CORRUPT CONSPIRACY.
11
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III. APPELLANTS HAVE NO CLAIM UNDER TITLE
57, CHAPTER 3, SECTION 8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953.
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AWARDED.

WAS

PROPERLY

ARGlJMENT
I

THE THEORY OF APPELLANTS IS AT VARIANCE
WITH THEIR THEORY BELOW.
Appellants' counterclaim espoused the theory that they
had been damaged by reason of a nfraudulent and corrupt"
conspiracy between Continental and Hal Hancock. All the
proceedings below were tuned to that theory, but now appellants assert an entirely different theory: tender of payment
and violation by respondent of the penal, double-damages,
slander of title provision, 57-3-8, Utah Code Annotated,
195 3, -raised by appellants for the first time on appeal ( App.
Btf. 5-7). The conspiracy theory lies mouldering.
A new theory may not be raised upon appeal, TwentySecond Corp. Etc. v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 36 Utah
238, 103 Pac. 243 ( 1909); In re Beason's Estate, 49 Utah 24,
161 Pac. 678 ( 1916); Evans v. Shand, 74 Utah 451, 280
Pac. 239 (1929); Fisher v. Bank of Spanish Fork, 93 Utah
514, 74 P.2d 659 ( 193 7); lJpton v. Heiselt, 118 Utah 573,
223 P.2d 428 ( 1950). In the Evans case, this Court stated at
240 Pac.:
((The rule is well settled that on an appeal the parties are restricted to the theory on which the case was
12
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prosecuted or defended in the court below. That is
especially true as to the theory accorded a pleading in
the court below which on appeal must be adhered to
and cannot be shifted. * * * Whatever liberality may
be accorded procedure, there nevertheless are certain
fundamental principles which cannot be disregarded.
These, among others, are that pleadings are the judicial means to invest the court with subject-matter
jurisdiction and to limit issues and to narrow proofs;
that courts cannot make a complaint for one thing
stand for a different thing; that recovery must be
secundum allegata et probata, which is but a necessary
deduction from the maxim that what is not judicially
presented cannot be judicially decided; that the statement of the cause of action or ground of defense as
laid binds the court as well as the parties; and that
there tnust be no departure is but another statement
of the maxim that it is vain to prove what is not
alleged. These principles a~e primary. (Citations deleted.)
Appellants based their case upon the theory of conspiracy; they have no standing to urge upon this court a
completely different theory now.
One 'mischief of appellants' maneuver is that it requires
expansion. of respondent's brief to demonstrate that, on the
basis of the uncontroverted facts of record, 57-3-8 is not
applicable. If premeditated, · it would appear to have been
designed to avoid an affirmative defense by respondent based
upon the one-year statute of limitation applicable to a statute
for a penalty, 78-12-29 Utah Code Annotated 1953, in
that the alleged tender and refusal took place on January 31,
1958, and defendants' counterclaim was not served or filed
until March 16, 1959 (R. 13).
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II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A FRAUDULENT AND
CORRUPT CONSPIRACY.
Appellants alleged a fraudulent and corrupt conspiracy.
By definition, civil or criminal conspiracy requires a combination of two or more persons seeking to accomplish by concerted action some criminal or unlawful act, or to accomplish
by criminal or unlawful means some act not in itself unlawful.
The elements of civil conspiracy are: ( 1) a combination of
two or more persons (one may plan or plot alone, but he
cannot conspire alone) ; ( 2) an actual combination, agreement •
or confederation with a common design; ( 3) the existence of
an unlawful purpose or act to be accomplished or done, or a
lawful purpose to be accomplished by unlawful means; ( 4)
wrongful intent; (5) damage. 11 Am. Jur., Conspiracy §§
3-5, 45. Bunce's testimony points out the facts in which appellants suspect a conspiracy:

((Q. In other \vords, other than the execution-and
I am just trying to find out what your story is here,
Mr. Bunce-other than the execution of this assignment
and the execution of the side agreement dated January
8, 1958, do you have any other facts upon which you
base your allegation that Continental entered into a
fraudulent and corrupt conspiracy?
((A. Not that I know of.

((Q. Pardon?
((A. I guess that is about all. They took that note
and that is all I know about it.

tQ. In other words, whatever fraudulent and corrupt
conspiracy there was would be represented by these
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two documents? You don't know of any other facts
other than those, do you ?
ttA. No.
tiQ. Why do you feel that the execution of these
documents was a fraudulent and corrupt conspiracy?
((A. Well, I think if it has been executed right, I
think the bank would have got their money in the
first place. And in the second place, I think if the
bank had been right, they would have took our money
when we came up here 'and delivered our mortgage
back, as long as it was past due. Their contract with
this other party was past due and I think the bank
should have taken our money.

*

*

*

tiQ. You have got a number of things recited in
here. I wonder if any of them you contend Continental
had anything to do with?
tiA. All I 'contend is that Continental supposedly
sold him an assignment on a mortgage. As far as Continental, I would hate to think that a bank or anybody
would go far enough that they would go in with a guy
like Hancock or Dickson to throw-conspire a crooked
deal; I wouldn't quite say that much. But it looks kind
of bad, but I wouldn't quite go that far." (B. 38-39,

42).
Cunningham said he had no facts other than those given
by Bunce to support their claim of a fraudulent and corrupt
consptracy.
Those are the bare bones of ·the lawsuit, and in this case
the skeleton is the whole animal. If appellants cannot make
out a conspiracy from the documents of assignment and the
agreement between Hancock and Continental, the appeal must
fail.
·
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The conduct of Continental as shown by these documents
and the surrounding facts is completely consistent wth sound
and honest business practice. When it became apparent that
appellants weren't meeting their schedule of payments on the
unsecured loan, Continental sought some security. Appellants
offered a mortgage on property already the subject of a mortgage foreclosure action burdened by a contract of sale. Although of dubious value, the mortgage was a ((bird in the
hand," however small a bird. On the final day for redemption
Continental, which had decided (who would not say, ((wisely")
not to spend $3 5,000 more to save $2,000, was approached
by a stranger (Hancock) who wished to acquire Continental's
interest. Even if Hancock had been the agent of Dickson
(which apparently he was not), appellants had obtained a
decree eliminating Dickson's interest in the property, so there
was no right-duty relationship between Dickson and appellants with respect to the property. Han~ock' s obligation was
contingent upon other facts, it's true, but as Continental's
security would turn into a pumpkin at midnight, there was
nothing to lose by accepting· Hancock's proposal.
In exchange for an assignment to him of the appellant's
note and mortgage, Hancock gave Continental his note for the
same amount, to be paid if he succeeded in redeeming the
property; if he failed he could reassign the documents and get
his note back. Certainly Hancock's note was good consideration
for Continental's assignment.
Appellants suggest that there was something si,nister about
the transaction because appellants' note was retained by .Continental. But the assignment expressly included both the note
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and mortgage and it is well established that a note may be
assigned by a separate instrument even where the note itself
is not delivered.
This court in Thatcher v. Merriam, 121 Utah 191, 240
P.2d 266 ( 1952), quoted with approval the following language:
Like an ordinary chose in action, a bill or note rna y
be transferred by assignment or by mere delivery with
the usual incidence of such a transfer, and this rule
is not changed by the negotiable instrument law. * * *
It may be formal or informal; * * * it may be by
separate instrument, or in the absence of a statute to
the contrary, by parole * * * .
t t

({While it has been held where there is a, note, bond,
or other written obligation evidencing the debt, that
there must be a delivery of the instrument, it is generally held that delivery is not necessary if the assignment is proved by other satisfactory evidence. Thus,
where an assignment of a chose in action is made by
a separate paper it will be valid, although the written
evidence of the chose in action is not delivered."
(Supra, p. 270).
As the above case pointed out, appellants' citation of
44-1-37 UCA 1953 is inapplicable, as it deals with negotiation of a note (i.e., the formalities necessary to make the
transferee a holder in due course) and does not deal wrth
transfer of the chose which the note represents. See also
Johnson v. Beickey, 64 Utah 43, 228 Pac. 189 ( 1924).
The transaction with Hancock is hardly evidence of conspiracy. As stated in Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co.,
4 Utah 2d 303, 293 P .2d 700 ( 1956).
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((Inferences are made for the purpose of aiding
reason, not to override it. Inferences are nothing more
than the probable or rational explanations of facts.
Common sense and reason dictate that evil influences
should not be permitted to be drawn from routine
business transactions where there are no other circumstances. To hold otherwise would throw the door open
for an attack on each and every transaction that one
might enter into." (Supra, P. 702).
Respondent is puzzled by the appellants' assertion that
ttthere was no redemption of the property prior to January
20, 1958, and hence no obligation to pay Continental and
therefore consideration to support the assignment was totally
lacking." (App. Brf. p. 12). Appellants cite no authority
for this amazing logic. Moreover, nthe defense that an assignment was made without consideration is not one * * * which
ordinarii y rna y be raised by the debtor in an action by the
assignee; in other words, in an action against the original
debtor or obligor, the assignee may generally recover, even
though there was no consideration for the transfer." 4 Am.
fur. Assign1nents, § 83. See also Restatement of Contracts,
§ 158, and Thatcher v. Merriam, supra, at 240 P.2d 270.
The documents show that Hancock's obligation under the
~greement was either to pay off his note to Continental fo~
$2,133.47, or to reassign the note and mortgage. The first
alternative was only effective if Hancock was successful in
redeeming the property. He was not successful. Therefore
he chose the second alternative. Since he assumed a legal
burden which prevented him from redeeming without paying
the note to Continental, there was adequate consideration for
the assignment.
18
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The undisputed facts are that when appellants purportedly
made their tender to Continental on January 31, 1958, the
assignment was still outstanding. As it is apparent from the
face of the document that there is no condition subsequent
by which the assignment became null and void after January
20, Continental could not release what it did not own whether or not payment was tendered.
The issue is as simple as that. Characterizing a perfect! y
legal transaction as a ({false and fraudulent conspiracy" without
a scintilla of supporting evidence or even one case citation
dealing with the question of conspiracy may possibly be understood as the hysterical reaction of disappointed entrepreneurs,
but is hardly proper as an allegation in a court of law.
III
APPELLANTS HAVE NO CLAIM UNDER TITLE
57, CHAPTER 3, SECTION 8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953.
Appellants' theory relative to 57-3-8 UCA 1953, raised
for the first time on appeal, is as unfounded as the ({fraudulent
and corrupt conspiracy" they pleaded.
In the first place, it is manifest that (taken in the context
of Chapter 3 of Title 57, ({Recording Conveyances" and noting
that it immediately follows 57-3-6, ({Discharge by certificate"
and 57-3-7, ({Discharge of liens by marginal entry"), 57-3-8
refers only to those damages which result from the slander
of mortgagor's title by virtue of a satisfied mortgage remaining
of record. In this regard, see 1 Glenn on Mortgages, § 50.1
at page 321; Nalder v. Kellogg Sales Co., 4 Utah 2d 117, 288
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P .2d 456 ( 195 5). Appellants allege no such damage. It is clear
that First Security, which had actual notice both of Continental's
mortgage and of assignment to Hancock, was far from concerned with the fact that the Continental mortgage was of
fecord. It wanted out from under the threat of suit by Hancock.
Second, th_e mortgage was under assignment to Hancock
at the time of the purported tender. Although such assignment
was unrecorded, appellants had actual notice of it (B. 37).
Under such circumstances, tender to the assignor does not
result in the assignor's liability. It has been so held in cases
decided under statutes like ours, Harris v. Swanson} 67 Ala.
486 (1880); Lewis v. Cannon} 22 Ala. App. 634, 118 So. 911
( 1929); M~rphy v. Flemming} 69 Mich. 185, 36 N.W. 787
(1888); Brown v. Yarborough} ~30 Miss. 715, 94 So. 877
( 1923); Galloway v. LichfieldJ 8 Minn. 188 ( 1863).
Third, even if the court held that the assignment to Mr.
Hancock were ineffectual, the facts support-and do not in
any measure, by inference or otherwise, contradict-the good
faith of Continental, acting under advice of its attorney, in
believing the assignment to be in force on January 31, 1958.
This court has had occasion to hold tha~ a mortgagee, acting
in good faith and under advice of counsel, is not liable under
57-3-8 for failure to ·discharge a mortgage, Shibata v. Beat~
River State BankJ 115 Utah 395, 205 P.2d 251 (1957). As
stated at 2 Jones on Mortgages (7 Ed.) § 991:
((The mortgagee is not bound, upon tender of paynlent, to determine doubtful questions at his peril,
and he is not generally held liable to the statutory
penalty if his refusal is made in good faith and in the
honest belief that he is not bound to accept tender."
20
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In support of the foregoing are Harding v. Home lnv. &
s,u'. Co., 49 Idaho 64, 286 Pac. 920 (1930) reh. den., 49
Idaho 64, 297 Pac. 1101 ( 1930); Continental Bank v. Kowalsky, 247 Mich. 348, 225 N.W. 496 (1929); Wiener v. Automobile Finance Co., 347 Pa. 217, 31 A.2d 898 (1943);
Mathiew v. Boston, 51 S.D. 619, 216 N.W. 361, 56 A.L.R.
332 (1927).
Fourth, there is no evidence that appellants, after January
31, 1958, kept their tender good. This is a requirement for
recovery under the statute, 1 Glenn on Mortgages, § 53.
Fifth, if Continental's assignment to Hancock was tileffective, its right of redemption expired as of January 8, 1958.
Thus, on January 31, 1958, the relationship between appellants
and Continental was simply that of debtors and creditor.
Continental's mortgage was subject to the First Security action
and had been foreclosed. 1 It is well settled that 57-3-8, being
penal and strictly construed 2 , applies only to the mortgagormortgagee relationship, Draper v. f. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc.,
115 Utah 368, 204 P.2d 826 (1949). As of January 31, 1958,
Continental had neither mortgage nor (if appellants are correct) right of redemption.
Therefore, on at least five
of appellants is inapplicable.

g~ounds,

the new-found theory

178-37-3,

UCA 1953.
v. Bear River State Bank, supra.
3See footnotes 2-6, 6 Moore, Par. 56.04( 1) pp. 2029-30.

2Shibata
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IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY AWARDED.
The main thrust of appellants' argument is that there are
material issues between them and respondent which preclude
the rendition of summary judgment. ( App. Br. p 4-5). It
should be borne in mind that respondent's motion was based
inter alia upon the affidavit of Mr. Worsley and exhibits
attached to it and that appellants took no steps at all to
controvert any of the allegations in the affidavit. Appellants'
discussion appears to be founded upon two untenable premises: ( 1) that summary judgment must be denied if there is
any genuine issue of law even if there is no genuine issue
of material fact; ( 2) that the allegations of their pleading
cannot, on motion for summary judgment, be pierced by depositions, admissions and affidavits on file.
As to the first premise, Rule 56 does not contemplate that,
if the ascertainment of material facts upon which there is no
substantial controversy is practicable, the motion should be
denied due to the existence of issues of law. According to 6
MooreJs Federal Practice) par. 56.16 at pp. 2166-67, even
((The existence of an important, difficult, or complicated question of law, where there is no genuine
issue of material fact, is not a bar to summary judgment. Resolution of the legal issues is for the court,
and will not be rendered easier by going through the
futile motions of a trial where there is no issue of fact
to be tried.'' (Footnotes deleted.)
In Fox v. Johnson and Winzsatt, 127 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir.,
1952), the court stated at 127 F.2d 737:
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"Conflict concerning the ultimate and decisive conclusions to be drawn from undisputed facts does not
prevent rendition of a summary judgment, when that
conclusion is one to be drawn by the court. The court
had before it all the facts which formal trial would have
produced. Going through the motions of trial would
have been futile."
That the second premise of appellants is also unsound
is clear from a reading of Rule 56 (c) which provides for
the use of depositions, admissions and affidavits. In addition,
Rule 12 (c) provides for a judgment of the pleadings; if
pleadings are to control. Rule 56 is surplusage. 3 Barron and
Holtzoff, Federal P1·actice and Procedure, § 1231 at pp. 97-99,
indicates:
ttThe summary judgment procedure is a method for
promptly disposing of actions in which there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact ... It is intended
to promote the expeditious disposition of cases, and
avoid unnecessary trials where no genuine issues of fact
are raised. The procedure enables a party to pierce the

allegations of fact in the pleadings and obtain relief
by showing that there are no issues of fact to be tried."
(Footnotes eliminated; emphasis supplied.)
6 Moore, par. 56.04. ( 1) at pp. 2029-30 is in accord:
~( (T) he

rule permits a party to pierce the allegations
of fact in the pleadings and to obtain relief by summary
judgment where facts set forth in detail in affidavits,
depositions, and admissions on file show that there are
no genuine issues of material fact to be tried .... Even
though an issue may be forn1ally raised by the pleadings, summary judgment may be granted if there is
no genuine issue of material fact. The court is authorized to examine proffered materials extraneous to the
pleadings, not for the purpose of trying the case, but
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to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. If there is no such genuine issue,
the parties are not entitled to a trial and the court,
applying the law to the undisputed .material facts, may
render a summary judgment." (Footnotes eliminated.)
Again, at Volume 6, paragraph 55.11 (2), page 2065, Professor
Moore notes: cc (T)he real purpose of summary judgment
procedure is to afford a method fot piercing factual allegations
of pleadings, rather than to obtain a judgment solely on the
basis of the pleadings * * * ." Federal cases overwhelmingly
support the text writers. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cooper,
167 F.2d 651 (10 Cir., 1948), the rule was expressed-suecindy:
CCA motion for summary judgment should pierce the
formal allegations of an answer and should be sus·
tained, unless the existence of a genuine issue of fact
be shown.''
An identical approach is adopted toward pleadings seeking
affirmative relief, Burgert v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 F.2d
207 ( 8 Cir., 1957).
Utah has not developed a peculiar set of summary judgment rules at variance with federal practice. In a number of
cases, this court has affirmed summary judgments although,
obviously, questions of law existed and the bare pleadings
reflected factual disagreement, Morris v. Farnsworth Motel,
123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); Rees v. Murray City
Board of Education, 6 Utah 2d 196, 310 P.2d 387 (1957);
Holbrook v. Webster's, 7 Utah 2d 148, 320 P.2d 661 (1958).
Recently, this court, on interlocutory appeal, reversed an order
denying summary judgment, on the basis that facts about which
there was no genuine dispute entitled the movant to summary
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judgment as a matter of law, Aetna Loan Company v. Fidelity
and Deposit Company of Maryland, ____ Utah ____ , 346 P.2d
1078 (1959).
Summary judgments have been affirmed where, although
the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim upon which relief could
be granted, facts elicited through discovery procedure have
demonstrated that liability did not, as a mat~er of law, attach,
Matievich v. Hercules Powder G'o., 3 Utah 2d 283, 292 P.2d
1044 ( 1955); Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 7 Utah
2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957). In Abdulkadir, the court stated:
nExtensive pretrial discovery was employed by counsel for both parties, including the taking of depositions.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for a summary judgment, from which plaintiff appeals.
~~The

first attack plaintiff makes upon the summary
judgment is that the procedure is to hasty. He says that
if the case had been allowed to come to trial in its
regular turn on the calendar, he might have been able
to produce another 'vitness or witnesses. This contention
is withou·t merit. The accident happened over a year
before the motion for summary judgment was entered.
There was no reasonable assurance that the witness
referred to, a resident of California, might be found
within a reasonable time or at all, nor that his testimony would help plaintiff if available. Speaking generally, it is to be assumed that when a plaintiff files
his action he has sufficient evidence to demonstrate a
right to recovery. All he is entitled to is a reasonable
opportunity to marshal and present such evidence."
The appellant also contended that there were material issues
of fact in dispute and that he was entitled to a trial by jury.
This court responded:
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CWe are in accord with the idea that the right of
trial by jury should be scrupulously safeguarded. This,
of course, does not go so far as to require the submission
to a jury of issues of fact merely because they are disputed. If they would not establish a basis upon which
plaintiff could recover, no matter how they were
resolved, it would be useless to consume time, effort and
expen~e in trying them, the saving of which is the very
purpose C?,f summary judgment procedure. The pertinent inquiry is whether under any view of the facts
the plaintiff could recover. It is acknowledged that
in the face of a motion for dismissal on summary
judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to have the trial
court, and this court on review, consider all of the
evidence which plaintiff is able to present, and every
inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom in
the light tnost favorable to him." (Footnotes deleted.)
c

Of particular pertinence to the instant case is this court's
decision in Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d
303, 293 P.2d 700 ( 1956). The six causes of action set forth
in the complaint alleged that the corporate defendant, through
its president, Mr. Walter Mathesius, had conspired with an
individual defendant, Arth!J-r E. Moreton, Esq., to defraud
plaintiff's predecessors in connection with the purchase of their
interest in certain mining claims. Mr. Moreton owned a onefourth interest in such claims. He also acted as attorney for
his cotenants. Mr. Moreton received $287,500 for, his interest.
His cotenants, who were not informed of the amount received
by Mr. Moreton, were paid $100,000.
The trial court sustained Columbia's motion for summary
judgment on the basis of a record composed of pleadings,
depositions and affidavits. On appeal, this court characterized
the issue as follows:
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(W) hether any genuine issue of material fact exists . . . If there be no such issue, then the judgment
must be affirmed.
Otherwise, the action must be
,,
reversed . . .
cc

The trial court was affirmed inasmuch as the objective
facts were without dispute (293 P.2d 700-702, 703-704)
except those not material (293 P.2d 701-702). In order to prevail, therefore, appellant was obliged to argue that, from the
undisputed facts, a jury might properly infer the existence of
a conspiracy. The majority opinion noted at 293 P.2d 702·:
u

(W) e do not feel that appellants can be permitted

to draw favorable inferences from these facts. Inferences are made for the purpose of aiding reason, not to
override it. Inferences are nothing more than the probable or natural explanations of facts. Common sense
and reason dictate that evil inferences should not be
permitted to be drawn from routine business transactions where there are no other circumstances. To
hold otherwise would throw the door open for an
attack on each and every transaction that one might
enter into." (Citations deleted).
The concurring opinion, at 293 P.2d 704-705, noted:
UPlaintiffs argue that if in viewing the foregoing
facts in the light most favorable to them there exists
even ta slight doubt' as to whether Mathesius participated in furthering a fraud, the summary judgment
must be reversed. This somewhat overstates the case
for the plaintiffs. It is true, indeed, that a summary
judgment is a drastic remedy which the courts are,
and should be reluctant to use. Yet it does have a
salutary purpose in the administration of justice in
not requiring the time, trouble and expense of trial,
when the best showing the plaintiff can possibly claim
would not entitle him to a judgment.
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((Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff does not . mean that the co~rt should
pick out all of the aspects thereof favorable to sup. porting plaintiff's claim and ignore those tha·t indicate
to the contrary. It means that the court surveys the
whole picture, takes into consideration facts and inferences therefrom tending to favor the plaintiff's
position, and also considers other facts appearing which
must be accepted as a matter of law, and weighs the
whole matter against the background of legal precepts
bearing on the problem. If when so viewed, reasonable
minds could make findings that would make out a
cause of action in accordance with the plaintiff's claims,
summary judgment should not be granted; on the
other hand, if it appears to the court that reasonable
minds could not make findings which would establish
a cause of action for the plaintiff, then the summary
judgment is proper." (Footnotes deleted.)
The concurrence continued:
((In the event of trial, the burden will be upon the
plaintiffs to prevail by a preponderance, or greater
weight of the evidence. This cannot be done upon
circumstances which are equally reconcilable with right
as with wrong conduct." (Citing Alvardo v. Tucker,
2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P .2d 986 ( 1954).)
In Alvarado, this court held:
((The burden was upon the plaintiff ... ; such a finding of fact could not be based on mere speculation or
conjecture, but only on a preponderance of the evidence.
This means the greater weight of the evidence, or as is
sometimes stated, such degree of proof that the greater
probability of truth lies therein. A choice of probabilities does not meet this requirement. It creates only a
basis for conjecture on which a verdict of the jury
cannot stand." (Footnotes deleted.)
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, it is manifest that judgment
appealed from should be affirmed if the .facts of record, correctly reflected in respondent's unabridged statement thereof,
preclude recovery by appellants. It also is evident that reversal
would be improper if based upon the existence of issues of law
or disputed pleadings. In the analysis of undisputed facts,
conjectural or speculative inferences-at odds with reasonable
probabilities or embracing a presumption of rascality-should
not be afforded effect.
Respect~ully

submitted,

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Albert J. Colton
Kent Shearer
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APPENDIX A
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SA~T LAKE COUNTY,
.

'

STATE OF UTAH

CONTIN.ENTAL BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a State Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.
119214

CHARLES CUNNINGHAM and
WINFORD BUNCE,
Defendants.

ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
Comes now the defendants, Charles Cuningham and
Winford Bunce, through their attorneys of record, Maxwell
Bentley and Harry E. Snow·, and in response to the plaintiff's
Request for Admissions, gives the following answers:
1. Admits that Exhibits A, B, C, and D attached to the
plaintiff's Request .for Admissions are true and correct copies
of the instruments referred to in said Requests for Admissions.
2. Admits Paragraph 5 of plaintiff's Request for Admissions.
Dated this 20th day of July, 1959.

Is/ MAXWELL BENTLEY
Maxwell Bentley
Attorney for Defendants
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, U tab
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Answers to Request for
Admissions to the plaintiff by mailing a copy of the same to
plaintiffs attorney, Albert J. Colton and Kent Shearer, of the
firm of Fabian, Clendenin, Mabey, Billings & Stoddard, 800
Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day
of July, 1959.
Is/ Maxwell Bentley
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